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CRACKING THE CODE: COMPUTER CODE AS PURE 
SPEECH AND ITS FIRST AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS ON 
THE 3D PRINTED FIREARMS CONTROVERSY 
Brian E. Heckmann* 
ABSTRACT 
The advent of three-dimensional (3D) printing presents unprecedented 
challenges to the regulation of digital speech. Whereas previously, ideas 
constructed solely of computer code remained reliably in cyberspace, 3D 
printing allows for near unlimited physical realization of previously 
electronic concepts through relatively rapid prototyping. No controversy 
better exemplifies these challenges than that of 3D printed firearms. Those 
promoting the availability of 3D printed firearms have waged a years-long 
legal battle for the right to participate in the marketplace of ideas, and, at 
every turn, have raised First Amendment challenges to the regulations 
preventing them from doing so. However, even decades after the near 
ubiquitous adoption of the personal computer and internet, the Supreme 
Court still has not addressed the status of computer code under the First 
status by viewing lower court precedent through the lens of a detailed 
understanding of computer science, and by providing originalist support 
through a historical analog. Then, this comment applies the accurate First 
Amendment status of computer code to address the 3D printed gun 
controversy. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On May 5, 2013, Defense Distributed published on its website computer 
almost entirely out of plastic and produced by a 3D printer.1 Within a matter 
of days, Defense Distributed received a letter from the United States 
Department of State demanding the removal of all CAD files for 3D printable 
 
1 Lee Hutchinson, The First Entirely 3D Printed Handgun Is Here, ARSTECHNICA (May 3, 2013, 
7:00 PM), https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2013/05/the-first-entirely-3d-printed-handgun-is-here/. 
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firearms from its website alleging noncompliance with the Arms Export 
Control Act (AECA) and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations 
(ITAR).2 
demands, it also eventually filed suit in the United States District Court for 
the Western District of Texas alleging, among other things, that prohibiting 
publication of the CAD files under AECA and ITAR amounted to an 
3 
 future 
prohibition of 3D printed firearms using ITAR is uncertain. The State 
Department conceded that AECA and ITAR do not prohibit or prevent purely 
domestic electronic exchanges of the CAD files,4 and ITAR allows for 
exemptions to be made by the appropriate federal agency on a case-by-case 
basis.5 Furthermore, the Trump administration has endorsed specifically 
exempting firearm CAD files from the United States Munitions List 
(USML),6 a practice likely to change with every presidential transition 
between Democrats and Republicans.  
In June of 2018, Defense Distributed settled its legal dispute with the 
with AECA and ITAR by restricting the dissemination of the CAD files to 
consumers within the United States.7 In response, the State Department 
agreed to exempt the files from the USML.8 However, several states and the 
 
2 Andy Greenberg, State Department Demands Takedown of 3D-Printable Gun Files for Possible 
Export Control Violations, FORBES (May 9, 2013, 2:36 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/05/09/state-department-demands-takedown-of-3d-
printable-gun-for-possible-export-control-violation/#75d73150375f. 
3 See generally Def. Distributed v. U.S. Dep t of State, 121 F. Supp. 3d 680 (W.D. Tex. 2015). 
4 Id. at 695. 
5 See 22 C.F.R. § 125.4 (b)(13) (2019). 
6 First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 3 4, Wash. v. U.S. Dep t of 
State, No. C18-1115RSL (W.D. Wash. Aug. 2, 2018) [hereinafter Washington Complaint]. 
7 Admittedly, there are concerns that third parties who legally procure Defense Distributed s CAD 
files could then turn around and post them for international download on the dark web or that international 
consumers using VPN services could fraudulently represent themselves to Defense Distributed as 
domestic consumers. However, neither possibility would render Defense Distributed liable for those 
actions so long as Defense Distributed took all reasonable measures to ensure that access to the files was 
only available in the United States. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 448 (1965) (stating that third 
party criminal act is a superseding intervening cause unless the third party s criminal act is so foreseeable 
as to put the original party on notice). 
8 See Christopher Carbone, Texan Says He s Selling 3-D Printed Gun Plans, Despite Ruling, FOX 
NEWS (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.foxnews.com/tech/texan-says-hes-selling-3-d-printed-gun-plans-
despite-ruling; Megan Flynn, Data Allowing People to Print out Their Own Guns Temporarily Blocked 
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District of Columbia sued to enjoin the State Department from enacting this 
settlement in an attempt to further prevent Defense Distributed from 
publishing its CAD files.9 
 publication of 
CAD files further complicates an already unprecedented legal issue 
combining: (1) The uniqueness and complexity of computer code; (2) the full 
legislation with which the States or Federal governments have attempted to 
regulate the purely domestic transfer of this type of electronic information; 
and (4) the emerging technology of 3D printing, which has the practical effect 
of blurring the already often nebulous line between speech and conduct.  
Of the forty-eight page complaint filed in the Western District of 
Washington, twenty full pages are dedicated, not to any discussion of AECA 
or ITAR or the legality of allowing persons outside of the United States to 
download the CAD files, but to speculative10 adverse effects the availability 
11 
Therefore, the apparent intent of the petitioning states is to prevent the 
dissemination of the CAD files with or without AECA and ITAR, and if need 
be by state specific legislation.  
This comment aims to simplify this complex legal issue through a 
methodical examination of both computer code and First Amendment 
jurisprudence. In order to do this, the comment will be divided into four 
principal sections. The first will examine the technical properties of computer 
code and 3D printing12; because it is plainly obvious that no legitimate legal 
analysis can occur if the nature of what is being analyzed is misunderstood. 
The second section will take this understanding of code and compare it to 
legal precedent and historical evidence, to support the conclusion that 
computer code is pure speech rather than expressive conduct.13 In the third 
section, this comment will analyze the current federal mechanism and 
 
9 Kenneth Hall, Federal Judge Temporarily Halts Distribution of 3D Gun Blueprints, JURIST 
(Aug. 1, 2018, 11:38 AM), https://www.jurist.org/news/2018/08/federal-judge-temporarily-halts-
distribution-of-3d-gun-blueprints/. 
10 As of March 16, 2019, according to Westlaw, there has not been a single case in the entire 
United States in either federal or state court involving violations of the Undetectable Firearms Act of 1988. 
Nor do the petitioning States articulate in their complaint how a 3D printed firearm in substantial 
compliance with the Act (and other federal firearms regulations such as the National Firearms Act of 
1934) would harm the States  interest in maintaining public safety. The complaint relies on a mere 
formulaic recitation of existing firearms laws in each state and a conclusory assertion that the publication 
of the CAD files will undermine those laws unsupported by any reference to actual incidents where the 
laws have been undermined. 
11 Washington Complaint, supra note 6, at 21 41. 
12 See infra Section II. 
13 See infra Section III. 
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prospective state mechanisms used to prevent publication of the CAD files to 
Amendment.14 Lastly, the final section will discuss possible regulatory 
measures that could pass constitutional muster.15   
II. BASIC COMPUTER SCIENCE AND 3D PRINTING PRIMER 
In order to intelligently examine the First Amendment properties of 3D 
printing, it is pertinent to provide a primer on the technological realities of 
computer code and 3D printing. 
A. Computer Code Fundamentals 
At a 50,000-foot perspective, computer code can generally be broken 
down into two distinct types of code: (1) the object code; and (2) the source 
code.16 The object code is what directs the computer to engage in a certain 
activity.17 Specifically, the object code instructs the computer to process 
input.18 What appears to the user on the screen is the end result of this process. 
Object code operates on the most fundamental level of computer function, 
dealing with the basic unit of a binary digit.19 Whenever a movie, a tv show, 
audience typically sees a large series of numbers (usually 1s or 0s), the real 
life analog to what is being shown is the object code operating at the binary 
digit level.20 
Object code is the least abstract and most arduous version of computer 
code for humans to understand or use.21 However, it is critically important to 
note that it is still possible for humans to understand object code.22 Since it is 
difficult and time consuming to construct complex operations directly from 
 
14 See infra Section IV. 
15 See infra Section V. 
16 HARRY HENDERSON, Compiler, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPUTER SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY 95, 95 97 (2009). 
17 Id.; HARRY HENDERSON, Bits and Bytes, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPUTER SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY 50, 50 51 (2009). 
18 HENDERSON, supra note 16, at 95 97; HENDERSON, supra note 17, at 50 51. 
19 Id. 
20 HENDERSON, supra note 17, at 50 51. 
21 HARRY HENDERSON, Programming Languages, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPUTER 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 388, 388 89 (2009). 
22 Id. 
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object code, computer scientists will optimize the creation of new functions 
through the use of a programming language.23 This optimized version of code 
is known as source code.24 How the source code is actually written depends 
on the language it is written in. For example, construction of source code 
follows different rules if coding in C, compared to C++, or Java.25 Yet despite 
the different rules of construction, these programming languages can be used 
to program the same functions. The choice of which programming language 
is used is largely determined by the preference of the programmer and his 
familiarity with the language.  
In essence, different programming languages and their rules of 
construction are directly analogous to various spoken languages and their 
respec
Amendment generally prohibits prior restraints, except for those which could 
subject, direct object, verb, etc.) would undoubtedly vary significantly 
between, for example, German and Italian. However, the fundamental 
concept expressed by sentence would be the same regardless of the difference 
in language. So, too, with programming languages, where the means of how 
the programmer tells the computer what he wants to happen will vary but 
what idea is conveyed will be the same regardless of the programming 
language the function has been coded in.26 
In order to bridge the gap between highly abstract source code and the 
least abstract object code, computers use a process known as compilation.27 
The source code is run through the compiler, the compiler interprets the 
directives desired by the source code and outputs those directives in object 
code for the machine to act on.28 
B. 3D Printing Fundamentals 
The 3D printing process follows the same general procedure regardless 
of the particular software or hardware that is being used by the printer.29 First, 





26 See infra Part III(A). 
27 HENDERSON, supra note 16, at 95 96. 
28 Id. 
29 See generally RAFIQ NOORANI, 3D PRINTING: TECHNOLOGY, APPLICATIONS, AND SELECTION 
31, 31 52 (2017). 
30 Id. at 34 36. 
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the electronic design of blueprints that previously would have been drawn by 
hand.31 Second, that CAD file is converted into a Stereolithography (STL) 
file.32 This conversion essentially takes the 3D object in the CAD file and 
interprets it as a series of coordinates along the X, Y, and Z axes.33 When 
ibe a connected set of triangles to 
34 This conversion is usually 
file to be exported for use in a different program.35 
 Third, the STL file is then processed through a slicing program that 
takes the object and slices it into hundreds of two-dimensional cross-
sectioned layers.36 Slicing programs are usually proprietary to each 3D 
printer manufacturer, but all manufacturers still use this slicing process.37 The 
slicing process is the last opportunity for the user to modify any aspects of 
the printed object.38 While the slicing program will not allow the user to 
completely change the design of an object to do so would require starting 
over again at the CAD stage
thickness, quality of print, extrusion temperature, material, in fill percentage, 
39  
Fourth, the printer runs and creates the object by layering hot filament 
onto the build platform in the shape of a cross-section.40 Then, once it has 
finished one layer, the build platform is moved slightly down, and the process 
begins again with the next cross-section layer.41 Fifth, and lastly, the object 
examined for defects, any extra material is removed, and the object is 
cleaned.42 The code of the original CAD-designed object is thus involved 
throughout the entire process, albeit in three different iterations.43 The only 
part of the process where code may not be involved is the post processing 
 
31 HARRY HENDERSON, Computer-Aided Design and Manufacturing, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
COMPUTER SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 98, 98 99 (2009). 
32 NOORANI, supra note 29, at 36 39. 
33 Id. at 36 37. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 37. 




40 Id. at 40. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 40 42. 
43 See generally id. at 31 52. 
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stage, but only if the postprocessing is done by hand or without the aid of 
computers. 
III.  COMPUTER CODE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED A MEDIUM OF 
PURE SPEECH UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court of the United States has never 
(apart from its status under copyright and trademark law). There are three 
possible interpretations on the issue: first, that computer code constitutes pure 
speech comparable to traditional language; second, that computer code is 
expressive conduct with non-speech elements; and third, that computer code 
is conduct with no communicative qualities as speech and thus exists outside 
of the protections of the First Amendment.44 Without a clear statement of 
interpretation from the Court, various lower courts have endorsed differing 
interpretations.45 However, as will be discussed, the conclusion that computer 
code is pure speech comparable to traditional languages more accurately 
reflects the realities of how computer code operates. Furthermore, this 
interpretation receives such considerable originalist support that it should 
prevail over all other interpretations.46 
A. Existing Case Law Supports This Conclusion 
Two of the most comprehensive cases to discuss the First Amendment 
status of computer code are Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley and 
Bernstein v. United States Department of State.47 In Corley, Mr. Corley 
developed decryption software that could be used to remove the anti-piracy 
encryption protecting copywritten movies distributed on DVDs.48 While the 
court ruled that computer code is protected as pure speech under the First 
Amendment,49 it then created a false distinction between computer code and 
 
44 John P. Collins, Jr., Note, Speaking in Code, 106 YALE L.J. 2691, 2691 92 (1997). 
45 Compare Universal Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 451 (2d Cir. 2001), with Bernstein v. 
U.S. Dep t of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1435 37 (N.D. Cal. 1996); see also Mark C. Bennett, Was I 
Speaking to You?: Purely Functional Source Code As Noncovered Speech, 92 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1494, 1504
06 (2017). 
46 See infra Part III(B). 
47 See generally Corley, 273 F.3d 429; Bernstein, 922 F. Supp. 1426. 
48 See Corley, 273 F.3d at 436 40. 
49 If someone chose to write a novel entirely in computer object code by using strings of 1 s and 
0 s for each letter of each word, the resulting work would be no different for constitutional purposes than 
if it had been written in English.  Id. at 445 46. 
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certain computer programs.50 The court insinuated that the execution of 
would not be protected under the First Amendment.51  
This distinction is logically suspect. It would allow the government to 
censor otherwise protected speech, so long as it could be proven that the 
audience to whom the speech was directed did not understand the speech or 
ignored it.52 A rule like this would result in chaos, as any First Amendment 
decision regarding computer code or technology would be predicated upon 
the relative technological acumen of each individual plaintiff. Something as 
important as the fundamental right of a speaker to publish his wares in the 
marketplace of ideas53 depends no more on the ability of his audience to fully 
appreciate the nuances of every concept discussed than it would depend on 
54 
The Bernstein court endorsed a much more accurate (and unlike Corley, 
 First Amendment. Dr. 
Bernstein, then a Ph.D. candidate at UC Berkley studying applied 
mathematics, created an encryption and decryption program using the 
programming language C.55 
and the decryption program w 56 Dr. Bernstein 
wanted to publish his dissertation as well as Snuffle.c and Unsnuffle.c, to be 
 
50 See id. at 445 52. 
51 See id. at 448 49. 
52 By hinging its First Amendment analysis on the audience s reaction (or lack of reaction) to the 
speaker, the Corley court ignored significant Supreme Court jurisprudence to the contrary. Cf. Boos v. 
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (noting that the emotive impact of speech on an audience is not a 
secondary effect and therefore largely irrelevant to the First Amendment analysis); NAACP v. Claiborne 
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927 29 (1982) (reaffirming an exacting standard to censor speech based on 
the audience s possible incitement to violent and lawless action rather than a lower standard based on 
mere speculation of potential wrongful conduct by the audience). Additionally, future cases would 
reaffirm the insignificance of audience reaction. Cf. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 460 61 (2011) 
(stating that the emotional or physical pain effected upon the audience as a result of the speaker s offensive 
speech insufficient to abridge the First Amendment rights of the speaker). 
53 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 76 (1927) (Brandeis, J. concurring); Abrams v. 
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
54 Consider, for example, a video on Youtube.com of a law professor discussing Justice Jackson s 
famously profound opinion in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
The audio and video displayed could be identical to what a student in class would see and hear. But unless 
the YouTube viewer could explain to a court how exactly the audio and video were replicated through his 
computer or articulate some intercession of the mind or will  that occurred after initially clicking to play 
the video, then, under the Corley court s logic, the government would be justified in preventing that 
viewer s access to the speech even if they would not be justified in preventing access to an experienced 
software engineer or a law student present when the video was made. 
55 Bernstein v. U.S. Dep t of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1428 29 (N.D. Cal. 1996). 
56 Id. at 1429. 
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able to teach students the algorithm he used to create the programs and to 
present the code at academic conferences.57  
However, the AECA allows the President (and the Secretary of State, 
using the authority delegated to him through ITAR) to add certain items to 
the USML and prohibit their export or import without a license.58 Under 
section 121.1, Category XIII of the USML items known as, 
exclusions.59 Dr. Bernstein (much like Defense Distributed twenty-one years 
later) found himself at odds with the State Department, which insisted that 
both Snuffle.c and Unsnuffle.c required a license under the AECA prior to 
publication. Dr. Bernstein filed suit against the State Department alleging, 
among other things, that AECA and ITAR were unconstitutional as content 
based prior restraints on his speech both facially and as applied. 
Dr. Bernstein advocated that his code should be protected as pure 
speech, while the federal government argued that computer code did not 
constitute speech but was instead pure conduct that lacked sufficient elements 
of communication to be protected by the First Amendment under the Spence-
Hurley test.60 
misguided, dubious, and lacking any support in First Amendment 
jurisprudence.61 The court reasoned that Spence-Hurley nto the 
communicative nature of conduct only after concluding that the act at issue 
62 While the court 
63 it was so dissimilar to the 
non-verbal expressive conduct in the Spence progeny of cases that it would 
 
57 Id. at 1430. 
58 See id. at 1429; see also 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2014); 22 C.F.R. §§ 120 30 (2014). 
59 See Bernstein, 922 F. Supp. at 1429; see also 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (2018). 
60 See id. at 1434; see also Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974). 
61 Bernstein, 922 F. Supp. at 1434 36. 
62 Id. at 1434 (emphasis added). 
63 Whether source code and object code are functional is immaterial to the analysis at this stage. 
Contrary to defendants  suggestion, the functionality of a language does not make it any less like 
speech . . . Thus, even if [computer code] . . . is essentially functional, that does not remove it from 
the realm of speech. Instructions, do-it-yourself manuals, recipes, even technical information . . . are 
often purely functional; they are also speech. Music, for example, is speech protected under the First 
Amendment. The music inscribed in code on the roll of a player piano is no less protected for being 
wholly functional. Like source code converted to object code, it communicates  to and directs the 
instrument itself, rather than the musician, to produce the music. That does not mean it is not speech. 
Like music and mathematical equations, computer language is just that, language, and it 
communicates information either to a computer or to those who can read it.  
Id. at 1435. 
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determine how expressive it is when, at least formally, it appears to be 
64 
 It was clear to the Bernstein court, and should be clear to any 
practitioner of the law, that computer code is the written word.65 It may be 
written using a keyboard rather than a pen, or in C++ instead of English, but 
the Bernstein court correctly found these differences to be irrelevant.66 To 
support its conclusions, the Bernstein court cited the Ninth Circuit in holding: 
Of course, speech in any language consists of the 
putting pen to paper, or hand to keyboard. Yet the fact that 
that is, a 
sophisticated and complex system of understood 
meanings is what makes it speech. Language is by 
definition speech, and the regulation of any language is the 
regulation of speech.67 
The court further held that no particular language changes the nature of 
languages as a general concept under the First Amendment.68 For the 
purposes of the First Amendment, the court ruled that there is no meaningful 
difference between the abstract programming languages of source code 
(C++, Java, etc.), the relatively non-abstract object code, and traditional 
spoken languages such as English and Italian.69 
70 
Furthermore, once it had ruled that computer code and the languages that it 
operates in are definitively speech, the Bernstein court held that the 
functionality of such speech is immaterial.71 Even if the communication of 
ideas in a language was essentially functional, it does not change the quality 
of what is said in the language to something other than speech.72 
It is easy to see why Bernstein provides a more desirable holding for the 
 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 1434 35. 
66 See id. at 1435. 
67 Id. (quoting Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 934 (9th Cir. 1995), 
vacated as moot sub nom. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997)) (emphasis 
added). 
68 Bernstein, 922 F. Supp. at 1435. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 1435 37. 
72 Id. 
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under the First Amendment. Corley
computer science provides good reason to be hesitant to endorse the 
opinion.73 Even more damning to the Corley 
their opinion results in an illogical and unworkable analysis. Corley implies 
that it would consider code as analogous to traditional languages just as 
Bernstein would.74 Yet, it contradicts itself and would apply a different 
analytical framework to the same speech from different perspectives.75 If 
traditional languages were protected under the First Amendment in the 
manner adopted by Corley, it would result in absurd and chaotically different 
rulings antithetical to the purpose of the Amendment.76 By comparison, 
Bernstein is completely logical in its reasoning and provides consistent 
results regardless of the technological acumen of the audience. 
B. Cryptography as a Historical Analog Used by the Founders 
Provides Originalist Support for the Conclusion that Computer 
Code Is Pure Speech 
While the Bernstein 
considering computer code as pure speech, there is still a certain difficulty in 
reconciling a twenty-first century practice with the eighteenth-century 
concept of freedom of speech as understood by the founders and codified in 
the First Amendment. The Court has, in the past, addressed the First 
Amendment status of technology foreign to the founding generation based 
on its utility as a means for the conveyance of ideas.77 Yet, in the case of 
computer code, there is a very strong and persuasively analogous medium 
well-known to and used by the founders. One which they undoubtedly 
considered protected under the First Amendment: cryptography.  
Cryptography in the age before computers involved encoding written 
documents using cyphers to prevent the documents from being understood 
 
73 See supra notes 47 54. 
74 See Universal Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 445 46 (2d Cir. 2001). 
75 Id. at 447 48. 
76 See supra note 54. 
77 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952). Furthermore, in the context of the 
religion clauses, the Court has predicated much of their analysis on a historical understanding of the 
founders  intent; specifically, the understanding of the First Amendment of Thomas Jefferson and James 
Madison. See also McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 885 912 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Van 
Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 722 35 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 
609 31 (1992) (Souter, J., dissenting); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91 114 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 16 (1947). 
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by anybody other than the intended recipient.78 The ciphertext (encoded 
message) would be processed using a predetermined key (sometimes a word, 
sometimes a number to shift letters) and thus decoded into plaintext that any 
literate person could understand.79 The parallels between the process of 
classical encryption and that of computer processing are obvious. The source 
code (much like the ciphertext) acts as an abstract text, easily understood by 
those writing it but not by the computer awaiting instruction. The compiler 
serves the same function as the key, allowing for the translation of the cipher 
text and the ability to act on its information. Last, the object code resembles 
plaintext, the least abstract, most direct format of the information conveyed. 
Cryptography has existed nearly as long as the written word.80 As long 
as there has been powerful nations engaging in espionage, diplomacy, or 
military campaigns, there have been heads of state seeking to encrypt their 
81 Famously, Julius Caesar created his own skip cypher 
for use in his personal correspondence.82 Anybody who received a classical 
education such as the founding fathers would be familiar with the history 
of the Caesarian cypher.  
In particular, George Washington was undoubtedly familiar with the 
spymaster.83 Under his direction, Major Benjamin Tallmadge organized the 
famous Culper spy ring in New York.84 The ring would use a code book to 
encrypt letters sent out of Manhattan by replacing individual words with 
prearranged numbers (not conceptually dissimilar to the binary digits that 
make up object code).85 While Washington used the Culper code book, he 
also created his own ciphers to use in personal correspondence and military 
dispatches.86 
 
78 JOHN F. MURPHY, JR., Cryptography, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLIGENCE AND 
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE Vol. I, 182 83 (Rodney P. Carlisle ed., 2005). 
79 Id. 
80 See generally JOHN F. MURPHY, JR., Timeline of Intelligence, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE Vol. I, xv xvi (Rodney P. Carlisle ed., 2005). 
81 See generally id. 
82 SUETONIUS, The Life of Julius Caesar, in THE LIVES OF THE CAESARS, 54 (Catharine Edwards, 
trans., Oxford Univ. Press) (2000). 
83 See generally Edward G. Lengel, George Washington: Spymaster in Chief, MILITARY HISTORY 
(July 2009), https://www.historynet.com/george-washington-spymaster-chief.htm.  
84 See id.; The Culper Code Book, MOUNT VERNON, https://www.mountvernon.org/george-
washington/the-revolutionary-war/spying-and-espionage/the-culper-code-book/.  
85 The Culper Code Book, supra note 84; see also supra Section II(A). 
86 See Lengel, supra note 83. 
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Although modern legal orthodoxy holds that freedom of speech is not 
absolute87  therefore, strongly implying the founding fathers did not intend 
it as absolute either the protection of encoded messages and ciphers can 
easily be presumed from the content of the message and context in which the 
founders used them. This presumption survives even in the absence of an 
express statement of such protection. The best evidence for this is the letters 
between Thomas Jefferson and James Madison.88  
Jefferson first sent Madison a cypher to use for their communications in 
May 1785, while the former was serving as the second United States 
Ambassador to France.89 Jefferson and Madison did not usually encode the 
entirety of their correspondence, only those parts which they deemed 
pertinent to keep secret in case of interception.90 While some small parts of 
the letters were purely personal, most of the content was dedicated to matters 
of such social or political importance to the United States as to warrant First 
Amendment protection.91 For example, the writer would begin to talk about 
92 Then 
the letter would shift to encoded text, without breaking the grammar or syntax 
of the sentence, when the writer sought to provide his own personal insight 
 
87 [I]t is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all 
circumstances. There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and 
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.  Chaplinsky v. State 
of N.H., 315 U.S. 568, 571 72 (1942). A comprehensive list of the speech the Court holds categorically 
unprotected by the First Amendment is given by Justice Kennedy in the Court s opinion of United States 
v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 716 18 (2012). See also Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015) 
( Content-based laws those that target speech based on its communicative content are presumptively 
unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to 
serve compelling state interests. ). 
88 See generally Letters Between James Madison and Thomas Jefferson (1780 1826) (on file with 
the National Archives) available at 
https://founders.archives.gov/?q=Correspondent%3A%22Jefferson%2C%20Thomas%22%20Correspon
dent%3A%22Madison%2C%20James%22&s=1111211111&r=251. 
89 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (May 11, 1785) (on file with the National 
Archives) available at https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-08-02-0150. 
90 E.g., Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 23, 1788) (on file with the National 
Archives) available at 
https://founders.archives.gov/?q=Correspondent%3A%22Jefferson%2C%20Thomas%22%20Correspon
dent%3A%22Madison%2C%20James%22&s=1111311111&r=253. 
91 Id.; see also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 755 (1982) (discussing at length that part of the 
rationale behind categorical exclusion of certain speech was because that speech had little to no, literary, 
artistic, political, or scientific value ). 
92 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 20, 1785) (on file with the National 
Archives) available at 
https://founders.archives.gov/?q=Correspondent%3A%22Jefferson%2C%20Thomas%22%20Correspon
dent%3A%22Madison%2C%20James%22&s=1111311111&r=155. 
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in disrupting trade was an attempt to fracture the young union of states.93 
The content of the encoded text varied from international intrigue 
94 to domestic partisan 
schemes within Congress and the several states,95 to even personal matters 
and revelations such as Madison confiding in Jefferson that he, John Jay, and 
Alexander Hamilton wrote the Federalist Papers under the pseudonym of 
Publius.96 Yet, for how varied the subject matter was, one characteristic was 
constant: the encoded text was always of a nature that has been 
unquestionably held protected under the First Amendment.97  
-defined 
and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of 
which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional 98 The 
words encoded were not lewd or obscene,99 libelous,100 or profane.101 The 
words were not used to commission a crime.102 Instead, they were the 
medium through which two of the most significant legal minds in early 
American history participated in the diffusion of ideas, which is the very 
purpose103  
Perhaps the biggest motivation in adopting the free expression clause of 
the First Amendment was to preserve the free and open expression of ideas 
from the arbitrary censorship of a sovereign ideologically opposed to what 
 
93 Id. 
94 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 23, 1788) (on file with the National 
Archives) available at 
https://founders.archives.gov/?q=Correspondent%3A%22Jefferson%2C%20Thomas%22%20Correspon
dent%3A%22Madison%2C%20James%22&s=1111311111&r=254. 
95 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788) (on file with the National 
Archives) available at 
https://founders.archives.gov/?q=Correspondent%3A%22Jefferson%2C%20Thomas%22%20Correspon
dent%3A%22Madison%2C%20James%22&s=1111311111&r=259. 
96 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 10, 1788) (on file with the National 
Archives) available at https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-11-02-0159.  
97 Cf. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 72 (1942) (Where none of the categories 
the Court counted as categorically excluded would apply to the letters in question.). 
98 See id. 
99 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
100 See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
101 See generally Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
102 But it has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a course 
of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of 
language, either spoken, written, or printed.  Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 
(1949). 
103 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Abrams v. 
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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was being said.104 
correspondence as being protected from governmental censorship of the 
ideas expressed, but to also consider the same ideas further expressed in 
encoded text as unprotected is a completely arbitrary, illogical, and 
unworkable conclusion. The only logical conclusion is that the properties of 
speech under the First Amendment are unaffected by the medium of 
conveyance, to include encryption. Furthermore, it must be understood that 
the cipher itself is protected as a crucial component allowing speakers to 
utilize their reasonably chosen medium of communication. 
Last, it is worth noting that the Founders would likely consider their 
private correspondence protected from government interference under the 
Fourth Amendment.105 However, without taking an unnecessary detour 
through another expansive and complex area of constitutional jurisprudence, 
it should suffice to say that the forum of the speech conveyed (personal 
letters) is irrelevant.106 What matters is the substance of the ideas conveyed107 
and the mechanism used to convey them (cryptography). 
C. The DefCAD Files Are Not Only Pure Speech but also Pure 
Speech Protected Under the First Amendment 
As has been explored, the assertion that computer code is pure speech is 
supported by sound precedent108 as well as history.109 Yet, just because 
something is pure speech (or expressive conduct) does not mean that it will 
automatically receive First Amendment protection.110 There must be an 
inquiry into the message and context of the speech. For example, a picture 
can receive significant First Amendment protection when it depicts a 
 
104 See Police Dep t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972); Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 76 
(Brandeis, J., concurring); Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 31 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
105 The Founders would likely have considered private letters to fall under the papers  or 
effects  language of the Fourth Amendment. 
106 Compare Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 16 (1939), with New York v. 
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 755 (1982) (both speech in private and in the public fora that involves issues of 
public importance are protected). 
107 See generally Ferber, 458 U.S. at 755 (discussing at length that part of the rationale behind 
categorical exclusion of certain speech was because that speech had little to no literary, artistic, political, 
or scientific value ).  
108 See supra Section III(A). 
109 See supra Section III(B). 
110 See generally Ferber, 458 U.S. at 747; Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm n, 
447 U.S. 557 (1980); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
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running naked after her clothes have been burned off by napalm).111 But 
nobody would seriously claim that any protection should be given to similar 
pictures in other contexts (e.g., child pornography).112 This begs the question: 
what are the CAD files in dispute actually saying? 
speech with little to no constitutional protection is foolish and misguided. 
greater access to and ability to exercise the individual constitutional right to 
bear arms.113 The end result, the printed guns, are commodities. The CAD 
files are information that conveys the idea of that commodity yet to be 
realized. Does that idea hold any literary, artistic, political, educational, or 
scientific value?114 The objective, non-partisan answer is yes: these ideas 
have significant educational and scientific value as means for debating and 
experimenting with the engineering process of firearms. 
CAD files are not used exclusively in additive manufacturing.115 They 
are also the basis for traditional subtractive manufacturing.116 Conventional 
gun manufacturers will still design their firearms using CAD software, and 
then those electronic blueprints will be used with a lathe, which creates the 
firearm out of a steel block. The nature of CAD files allows the designer or 
the engineer the ability to effortlessly experiment and attempt to optimize 
their product.117 This is the purpose and message behind Defense 
change the files to try their own hands at engineering a firearm. As noted 
previously, up until the CAD file is sliced, there is still the opportunity to 
significantly alter it.118 These files facilitate the diffusion of ideas among the 
marketplace of ideas,119 albeit within the limited subsects of mechanical 
engineering, firearms manufacturing, and testing the tensile strength of 
different parts of the design. 
 
111 Nick Ut, THE TERROR OF WAR (1972), http://100photos.time.com/photos/nick-ut-terror-war.  
112 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 773. 
113 [A]dvertising which links a product to a current public debate  is not thereby entitled to the 
constitutional protection afforded noncommercial speech.  Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 
60, 68 (1983). 
114 Cf. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 755; Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (noting where the 
Court used these touchstones in their analysis determining whether speech should be protected). 
115 NOORANI, supra note 29, at 31 34. 
116 Id. 
117 HENDERSON, supra note 31, at 98 99. 
118 See supra Section II(B). 
119 See generally Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); 
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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Furthermore, 3D printing assists the amateur gunsmiths who lack the 
financial resources to experiment using conventional lathes (which cost 
thousands of dollars)120 and to procure the expensive raw materials used in 
the lathes. These CAD files and the 3D printing process provide a 
significantly lower barrier to entry. Amateur gunsmiths are also more likely 
to take risks in design than established manufacturers. Since the cost of 
production is relatively low, a mechanical engineer with a 3D printer could 
develop and test an innovative new firearm without having to worry about 
ruinous sunk costs. If his prototype fails catastrophically when tested, then 
he simply goes back to the drawing board. If his prototype works, he can 
patent it and begin to seek partners for large scale conventional 
manufacturing. By prohibiting the opportunity for limited capital inventors 
to use 3D printing and CAD files for experimentation, the State stunts the 
development of a lawful commodity. Furthermore, by restricting access to 
such resources the government creates a risk of censoring the speech of the 
disadvantaged amateur engineers who lack financial resources; which, in 
turn, creates concerns of favoritism and protectionism towards established 
manufacturers.121  
IV. EXISTING FEDERAL REGULATION IS FACIALLY NEUTRAL BUT 
CONSTITUTIONALLY INVALID DUE TO THE EXERCISE OF 
BOUNDLESS DISCRETION BY THE GOVERNMENT. 
PROSPECTIVE STATE REGULATION IS LIKELY TO BE 
FACIALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
Distributed, a primer on the law of prior restraints is well advised. A prior 
restraint is any form of regulation imposed by the government that 
prerequires government approval before somebody can speak.122 It is also, 
 
120 The CBT1640 CNC Metal Lathe, BOLTON TOOLS, https://boltontool.com/16-x-40-cnc-metal-
lathe-machine-with-six-poisition-toolpost-
cbt1640?search=CBT1640&gclid=CjwKCAjw4LfkBRBDEiwAc2DSlE4-
bIgbszPRMvj1MGPXi_Oyqkv0JJ08Kt05ueAEzlg3VBFfXwULyxoC108QAvD_BwE (last visited Mar. 
17, 2019). 
121 Cf. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1676 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining 
that by banning judicial candidates from individually soliciting campaign donations, the Florida law 
violated the First Amendment by favoring the political speech of some candidates the incumbent judges 
and wealthier candidates over that of the challenger or less wealthy candidates). 
122 In its simple, most blatant form, a prior restraint is a law which requires submission of speech 
to an official who may grant or deny permission to utter or publish it based upon its contents.  Alexander 
v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 566 (1993) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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rights . . . [it] has an immediate and irreversible sanction. If it can be said that 
123  
vali 124 However, they are not patently unconstitutional. A content 
of the regulated speech . . . narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
governmental interest, and . . . leave[s] open ample alternative channels for 
125 A content based prior restraint must 
satisfy strict scrutiny, meaning that the government must demonstrate the 
prior restraint serves the more demanding compelling interest standard.126  
Yet, even ostensibly content neutral restrictions on speech can be of 
such a quality that they are for all intents and purposes content based, and as 
such, the government must have a compelling reason to enact them.127 
Furthermore, while traditionally the Court has rejected the practice of 
determining and evaluating legislative motives,128 more recent cases have 
signaled that an improper legislative intent is a relevant part of the content 
based analysis.129 This shift in focus suggests that the current Court would be 
willing to strike down a facially neutral law under the strict scrutiny standard 
if they are able to elicit improper censorial motives in the enactment or 
enforcement of the law. 
Even if a prior restraint pas
neutral analysis, it will still be held as constitutionally invalid if it conditions 
 
123 Nebraska Press Ass n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976). 
124 Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971). 
125 Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). 
126 See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2231 (2015). 
127 Our precedents have also recognized a separate and additional category of laws that, though 
facially content neutral, will be considered content-based regulations of speech: laws that cannot be 
justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech,  or that were adopted by the government 
because of disagreement with the message [the speech] conveys,  . . . Those laws, like those that are 
content based on their face, must also satisfy strict scrutiny.  Id. at 2227. 
128 As we have said before, however, this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional 
statute on the basis of an alleged illicit motive.  City of Erie v. Pap s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 292 (2000). 
129 A law that is content based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the 
government s benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of animus toward the ideas contained  
in the regulated speech. . . . Because strict scrutiny applies either when a law is content based on its face 
or when the purpose and justification for the law are content based, a court must evaluate each question 
before it concludes that the law is content neutral and thus subject to a lower level of scrutiny. . . . The 
First Amendment requires no less. Innocent motives do not eliminate the danger of censorship presented 
by a facially content-based statute, as future government officials may one day wield such statutes to 
suppress disfavored speech.  Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228 29 (emphasis added). 
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130 The common sense, and perhaps well 
it would allow an otherwise facially content neutral prior restraint to be 
wielded in a discriminatory manner so as to censor speakers who advocate 
views the government official is ideologically or politically opposed to.131 
The speaker would be left with no recourse to challenge the censorship 
besides a lengthy and expensive legal battle,132 which they may well not be 
able to afford in either money or time. 
There is a significant difference between the analyses for prior restraints 
on pure speech and prior restraints on expressive conduct. Prior restraints of 
pure speech are analyzed under the Clark, Lakewood, and Saia precedents as 
previously mentioned.133 By comparison, restraints on expressive conduct are 
analyzed under a less rigorous standard. A prior restraint on expressive 
or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated 
to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on 
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the 
134  
The Defense Distributed court erroneously applied the lesser  
. . . as subject to the protection 135 This language 
implies the court considered the CAD files as expressive conduct but not pure 
speech.136 The prior sections of this comment have already discussed why 
that consideration was erroneous.137 Second, the court determined that the 
AECA, ITAR, and USML were content neutral prior restraints.138 That 
analysis was mistaken as it failed to consider how the Directorate of Defense 
Trade Controls (DDTC) abused its discretion by ignoring the statutorily 
prescribed safeguards to channel its decision-making authority; effectively 
 
130 City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 764 (1988). 
131 Cf. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228 29. See generally Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 560 61 (1948). 
132 See generally Saia, 334 U.S. at 560 61. 
133 See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2218; Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 750; Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-
Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 297 98 (1984); Saia, 334 U.S. at 558.  
134 United States v. O Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
135 Def. Distributed v. U.S. Dep t of State, 121 F. Supp. 3d 680, 692 (W.D. Tex. 2015) (emphasis 
added). 
136 Nota bene the fact that the court describes the files as subject to the protection of the First 
Amendment  and not as speech  is significant. Such a distinction has been used to distinguish the 
constitutional status of expressive conduct from pure speech. See generally Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 
397, 405 06 (1989). 
137 See supra Part II and Part III. 
138 Def. Distributed, 121 F. Supp. 3d at 694. 
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making the AECA, ITAR, and USML content based prior restraints as 
applied.139 
A. Federal Regulation Under AECA, ITAR, and USML Were Content 
Based As Applied Because the DDTC Failed to Follow the 
Mechanisms Prescribed to Channel Its Discretion 
It is obvious that the Western District of Texas erred in ruling that 
AECA, ITAR, and the USML acted in concert as content neutral prior 
restraints against Defense Distributed. This conclusion is based on two 
factual occurrences that went unanalyzed by the court and unexplained by 
on the CAD 
files140 outside of the proper commodity jurisdiction proceedings; and (2) the 
CAD files when such an inclusion clearly is not within the plain reading of 
the law. Both of these actions by the DDTC exhibit a disconcerting disregard 
for the statutorily prescribed rules141 
when evaluating whether or not an item is subject to ITAR under commodity 
jurisdiction.  
These actions raise the same concern over ideological or political abuse 
of boundless discretion the Court articulated in Saia and Reed.142 This 
concern is further compounded by reasonable inferences: (1) from the prior 
political actions of Kenneth B. Handelman,143 the Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of State for Defense Trade Controls who managed the DDTC at the time of 
the determination; (2) from the failure to provide a timely determination on 
the commodity jurisdiction requests as required by law;144 and (3) from the 
 
139 See infra Part IV(A). 
140 Complaint at 5, Def. Distributed v. U.S. Dep t of State, 121 F. Supp. 3d 680 (W.D. Tex. 2015) 
(No. 1:15-cv-372) [hereinafter Def. Distributed Complaint]. 
141 See 22 C.F.R. § 120.4 (2014). 
142 See generally Reed v. Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2218 (2015); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 
560 61 (1948). 
143 Prior to his work at the State Department, Handelman was the Legislative Director for Senator 
Howard Metzenbaum (D-OH), the initial sponsor of the Brady Handgun Bill. Kenneth B. Handelman: 
Former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, U.S. DEP T OF 
DEF., https://dod.defense.gov/About/Biographies/Biography-View/Article/618086/kenneth-b-
handelman/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2019); President Signs Brady  Gun Control Law, CQ ALMANAC 1993, 
300 03 (49th ed.), https://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/document.php?id=cqal93-1105725 (last visited 
Nov. 3, 2019); see also Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228 29. 
144 22 C.F.R. § 120.4(d)(2) (2014). 
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neral advocacy for greater gun control145 which 
146 
1. The DDTC Abused Its Discretion by Failing to Justify Its 
Irregular Conduct 
When the State Department originally contacted Defense Distributed 
regarding supposed noncompliance with ITAR, Defense Distributed 
submitted a commodity jurisdiction request to the DDTC for a miniature 
erate it.147 Defense 
Distributed also submitted nine further commodity jurisdiction requests for 
prepublication approval of firearm CAD files.148 Whenever the State 
USML, it provides the producer of the item the opportunity to request a 
commodity jurisdiction determination by submitting a specific form.149 Each 
 specifications, and any 
other documentation related to the article or service should be submitted as 
150  
These requests are specific to each individual item.151 For example, 
when Defense Distributed was first contacted by the State Department and, 
in response, submitted ten different commodity jurisdiction requests to 
include the Ghost Gunner lathe and nine CAD files,152 the commodity 
jurisdiction process required the DDTC to make an individualized 
determination of each request.153 However, two years after Defense 
 
145 See US Gun Debate: Obama Unveils Gun Control Proposals, BBC NEWS (Jan. 16, 2013), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-21049942; Party Platform: Preventing Gun Violence, 
DEMOCRATIC NAT L COMMITTEE, https://democrats.org/where-we-stand/the-issues/preventing-gun-
violence/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2019). 
146 Def. Distributed Complaint, supra note 140, at 4; About, DEF. DISTRIBUTED, 
https://defdist.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2019). 
147 Def. Distributed Complaint, supra note 140, at 4 5. 
148 Id. at 5. 
149 See generally 22 C.F.R. § 120.4 (2014). 
150 22 C.F.R. § 120.4(c) (2019). Nota bene the language of the statute is exclusively singular. The 
lack of plural verbiage indicates the statute requires individualized determinations, not ad hoc group 
determinations. 
151 22 C.F.R. § 120.4(c) (2019). 
152 Def. Distributed Complaint, supra note 140, at 7. 
153 22 C.F.R. § 120.4(d)(2) (2019). 
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Distributed filed commodity jurisdiction requests, the DDTC failed to 
provide determinations on any of the ten requests.154 
Defense Distributed submitted a second (and eleventh overall) request 
specifically regarding the Ghost Gunner lathe.155 Four months after this 
second request for the Ghost Gunner, the DDTC provided a determination.156 
But the outstanding nine requests never received a determination.157 While 
the DDTC determined the Ghost Gunner and software required to operate it 
were not subject to control under ITAR,158 the DDTC also added on to their 
determination regarding the Ghost Gunner (seemingly as an ad hoc 
afterthought) a statement notifying Defense Distributed that its other 
ng, and models for producing a 
defense article, to include 80% AR-15 lower receivers, are subject to the 
159 The 
State Department did this despite the fact that the specific Defense 
Distributed requested review of those items was never answered by the 
DDTC.160 This directly contradicts the requirement for an individualized 
determination set by Congress and constitutes an ultra vires abuse of the 
discretion provided to the DDTC under commodity jurisdiction 
proceedings.161 It also prevents Defense Distributed from understanding what 
characteristics or aspects of its CAD files cause the files to be subject to 
ITAR, thereby preventing Defense Distributed any meaningful opportunity 
 
These actions objectively raise the specter of politically motivated 
viewpoint censorship that the Court has categorically refused to 
countenance.162 
jurisdiction requests to wallow unanswered for over two years. Yet, the 
DDTC proved that it was capable of taking timely action by responding to 
y jurisdiction request for the Ghost 
Gunner lathe in four months. The lathe is, by any objective measure, far more 
capable of manufacturing effective and durable firearms than the 
experimental and fragile firearms derived from 3D printing.  
 
154 Def. Distributed Complaint, supra note 140, at 8. 






161 See 22 C.F.R. § 120.4 (2019). 
162 See Reed v. Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2228 29 (2015); see also Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 
558, 560 61 (1948); Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939). 
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Why was the DDT
software used to operate it presumably with the knowledge that CAD files 
are used as part of its operation but then refuse to allow publication of CAD 
files that had the stated purpose of being used in a 3D printer? This decision 
is nonsensical given the fact that the same CAD files could be used to operate 
the Ghost Gunner, even though there has been no indication that there is a 
demand for 3D printed firearms among the foreign enemies of the United 
preventing trafficking in arms,163 and the conclusion seems inescapable that 
the DDTC used ITAR as a mere pretext to censor political speech it did not 
like.164 If the decision was not politically motivated, it would follow logically 
that the Ghost Gunner lathe should have been restricted as subject to ITAR 
while the CAD files should have been approved.165 
2. The DDTC Abused Its Discretion by Imputing a Definition to 
That Is Both Unreasonable and 
Significantly Different Than the Definition Intended by 
Congress 
The second indication that the DDTC abused its discretion and engaged 
in viewpoint discrimination against Defense Distributed is the expansion of 
the statutory d
reading.166 Consistently throughout litigation, the State Department asserted 
that the CAD files in dispute are not defense articles in the traditional sense 
of munitions, but rather in the sense 167 While the court 
 
163 As previously mentioned, the 3D printing process is effectively limited to use in prototyping 
new firearms. 3D printing is cheaper, but often more time consuming and results in a more fragile product. 
The printed guns are more novelty than weapon of war. In contrast, a metal lathe can produce conventional 
small arms that are much more durable and practical to use on a battlefield. It therefore seems that the 
DDTC s decision to allow the export of the means to create conventional arms, while denying export of 
the means to create novelties, is counterproductive to the stated goal of preventing arms trafficking 
benefiting enemies of the United States. 
164 This conclusion is compounded by DDTC s failure to provide reasoning for decision, meaning 
that there can be no judicial review of their discretionary motives. This ambiguous government motive for 
censorship is far removed from the openly recognized benign motives  contemplated and expressly 
rejected by Reed. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228 29. 
165 See supra note 163. 
166 See 22 C.F.R. § 120.10 (2019). 
167 See generally Defendants  Opposition to Plaintiff s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Def. 
Distributed v. U.S. Dep t. of State, 121 F. Supp. 3d 680 (W.D. Tex. 2015) (No. 1:15-cv-372-RP); Brief 
of Respondent-Appellees, Def. Distributed v. U.S. Dep t. of State, 838 F.3d 451 (5th Cir. 2016). 
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defined168 to include information such as any non-software blueprints169 and 
software directly related to defense articles,170 the court clearly erred in 
171 The plain reading of the 
distinct groups: analog172 and software.173 The CAD files in dispute appear 
not to fit into either category, being a digital form of media but not software.  
Software is computer code that allows for the execution of files and the 
resulting action to be completed by the computer.174 The CAD files are what 
is being executed, not the software doing the execution.175  
to bar Defense Distributed from publishing the CAD files rather than 
properly adding CAD files to the USML under Category XXI176 until such a 
time as the technical data definition could be amended or otherwise clarified 
by Congress. Through this action, the DDTC abused its discretion and acted 
beyond the scope of its authority by reading, into a term defined by Congress, 
a secondary definition that Congress failed to write itself.177 The DDTC, a 
politically appointed position within the executive branch, in effect usurped 
the congressional prerogative to create and amend law. It further 
compounded this abuse of discretion by completely ignoring the statutorily 
provided mechanism for temporarily including a previously unconsidered 
item under the USML until Congress the proper authority could review 
the item and determine if it should be added to the USML. 
 
168 22 C.F.R. § 120.10 (2019). 
169 22 C.F.R. § 120.10(a)(1) (2019). 
170 22 C.F.R. § 120.10(a)(4) (2019). 
171 Def. Distributed, 121 F. Supp. 3d at 694. 
172 See 22 C.F.R. § 120.10(a)(1) (3) (2019). 
173 See 22 C.F.R. § 120.10(a)(4) (2019). 
174 See DANIEL B. GARRIE & FRANCIS M. ALLEGRA, PLUGGED IN: GUIDEBOOK TO SOFTWARE 
AND THE LAW § 2.1, at 45 46 (2013). 
175 See supra Section II(B). 
176 See 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 Category XXI (2019). 
177 Context establishes the conditions for applying the [Negative-Implication Cannon], but where 
those conditions exist, the principle that specification of the one implies exclusion of the other validly 
describes how people express themselves and understand verbal expression.  ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN 
A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 107 (2012). See also id. at 107 11. 
In Defense Distributed s case, the critical contexts are: (1) The express distinction between analog 
technical data (such as blueprints) and software made in 22 C.F.R. § 120.10(a)(1); (2) The absence of 
executable files but enumeration of application programs in 22 C.F.R. § 120.45(f) statutory definition of 
software ; and (3) The language of 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 Category XXI acting as a temporary catch all 
provision for articles not considered by Congress until such a time that Congress would decide to amend 
the USML. 
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It is hard to think of any possible legitimate motive for the DDTC to so 
blatantly abandon the explicitly defined due process. There simply is no 
objective justification for the DDTC to act in the way they did. At best, it 
may have been unbiased incompetence, but the worst-case scenario is 
patently unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. These acts strongly 
implicate the concern of political censorship178 specifically aimed179 at 
Def
the Democrats held the executive branch while the Republicans controlled 
both houses of Congress. If the DDTC had added the CAD files to Category 
XXI, it is unlikely that a gun-rights-friendly Congress would agree to include 
them in the USML (especially given the publicity of the 3D printed gun 
controversy and the upcoming 2016 election). This, obviously, was contrary 
to the political interests of the Obama administration and would prove 
problematic as Category XXI only allows for temporary restriction. But by 
disregarding procedure and congressional authority, the DDTC ensured the 
CAD files would not be disseminated either abroad or in the United States 
until there was either a successful legal challenge or a change in 
administration.  
B. Prospective State Regulation in the Form of a Complete Ban Is 
Unconstitutional 
At the time of the writing of this comment, no state, as of yet, has written 
any law regulating 3D printed firearms; and as such, this section is 
necessarily speculative and brief. For the time being, any state that does not 
because the injunction from the Western District of Washington makes other 
regulatory action unnecessarily redundant. However, should that injunction 
be invalidated, or the case resolved in some other manner, the states who did 
seek the injunction will almost certainly act to regulate 3D printed firearms 
in the absence of federal regulation.  
While no proposals have been put forward, the tone of the complaint 
and political stances of the state administrations suggest that the intended 
 
178 See generally Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 560 61 (1948). 
179 This inference is strengthened by the fact that the DDTC did not purport to restrict all firearm 
CAD files, only those published by Defense Distributed. As previously mentioned, conventional 
subtractive manufacturing of firearms also uses CAD files of the components. Many manufacturers such 
as Glock still manufacture their products overseas. Yet, there is no indication that the DDTC prohibited 
the engineers working for Glock in the United States from sending their CAD designs to the factory in 
Austria for production. See generally Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1676 (2015) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting). 
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course of action would be a total prohibition on the files.180 The states seem 
to be adverse to the idea of any level of public availability of the CAD files, 
and so it is unlikely they would implement a more limited time, place, or 
manner restriction.181 Therefore, the states would have to justify their 
regulation on the grounds that the CAD files are either categorically excluded 
from the protection of the First Amendment, or they would have to satisfy 
the strict scrutiny standard. Without any binding precedent specifically 
regarding 3D printed firearm CAD files, the lower courts would have to apply 
general principles of First Amendment law. Any prospective state laws 
resulting in a complete prohibition of the CAD files should be held invalid 
for the following well established doctrinal reasons. 
1. 3D Printed CAD Files Are Ineligible for Categorical 
Exclusion From First Amendment Protection Because the 
States Cannot Show An Unrecognized Historical Practice of 
Censorship 
As mentioned previously, computer code is best understood as pure 
speech,182 though not all pure speech falls within the protection of the First 
Amendment.183 However, the Court is incredibly hesitant to recognize new 
classes of categorically unprotected speech.184 A new class will be recognized 
only when the Court is, 
restriction on content is part of a long (if heretofore unrecognized) tradition 
185 Prohibiting 3D printed firearm CAD files obviously 
cannot pass this test. They are a novel emerging technology that did not exist 
even ten years ago, let alone sufficiently throughout American or English 
history to demonstrate a historical practice of proscription. 
 
cryptographic messages, were not categorically excluded from First 
Amendment protection.186 As both law and history are against the states 
seeking total prohibition, the only means of justifying a content-based total 
 
180 Washington Complaint, supra note 6, at 21 41. 
181 Id. 
182 See supra Section III. 
183 See generally United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 18 (2012); Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 72 (1942). 
184 See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 72 (2010). 
185 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 722 (quoting Brown v. Entm t Merchs. Ass n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011)). 
186 See supra Section III(B). 
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prohibition left to them would be to argue that the regulation satisfies strict 
scrutiny.187 
2. Strict Scrutiny Is Not Satisfied Becau
Interest Is Compelling, a Complete Ban Is Not Narrowly 
Tailored 
dissemination of the CAD files is rooted in public safety.188 It hardly needs 
to be recognized that firearms are capable of harming people. Nor is it a 
and stripping them of their individual right to own a firearm can be absolutely 
trating a proclivity 
towards harming others.189 Therefore, even in the event that the Court decides 
to engage in a Reed-like legislative motive inquiry, it is all but indisputable 
that the states have a legitimate and non-partisan compelling interest in 
protecting their citizens from prohibited individuals unlawfully acquiring 
firearms. The question then becomes: is the means of achieving this
through total prohibition of access to the CAD files sufficiently narrowly 
interest? 
source of the evils the [government] seeks to eliminate . . . and eliminates 
them without at the same time banning or significantly restricting a 
substantial quantity of spe 190 In the 
context of 3D printed firearm CAD files, this means that if there is a 
substantial quantity of speakers prevented from using the files to convey 
information and ideas that do not endanger public safety, then the prospective 
statute is not sufficiently narrowly tailored and must fail strict scrutiny.  
It is obvious that a total ban on publication, allowing no exceptions, 
would suppress all speakers regardless of their lawful or unlawful intended 
 
187 Several doctrines that would allow for content-based regulation under less exacting scrutiny 
are inapplicable in Defense Distributed s case. Defense Distributed desires to disseminate the files free of 
charge; therefore, they are not proposing a commercial transaction and the commercial speech doctrine 
does not apply. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 423 (1993). Defense 
Distributed does not advocate for violent and/or unlawful use of the weapons produced from their CAD 
files; therefore, Defense Distributed s speech does not communicate a serious expression of an intent to 
commit an act of unlawful violence  that would invoke the true threat doctrine. See also Virginia v. Black, 
538 U.S. 343, 359 60 (2003). 
188 See generally Washington Complaint, supra note 6, at 2. 
189 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2019) (detailing the criteria for prohibited persons). 
190 THOMAS E. BAKER ET AL., FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 367 (4th ed. 2018) (quoting Ward v. Rock 
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 n.7 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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use of the CAD files. As such, not only would the ban prevent the evil the 
states seek to prevent prohibited persons obtaining firearms outside of the 
lawful clearance process but it would chill the speech of lawful speakers 
such as mechanical engineering students, licensed firearm manufacturers, or 
lawfully permitted amateur gunsmiths.191 The doctrine of narrow tailoring is 
not a balancing analysis;192 it does not require a showing that there are 
substantially more lawful speakers effected than unlawful speakers, just that 
there is a substantial number of lawful speakers who could be affected.  
According to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, there are 
68,341 individuals or companies who in 2017 were licensed to engage in 
gunsmithing or manufacturing.193 This represents 85 percent of all federal 
firearm license holders in the United States. Even if each license holder were 
were discounted, this number represents a substantial population of speakers 
by any means. This also excludes the countless number of mechanical 
engineering students who may use these files for purely academic purposes. 
With so many lawful speakers being affected by a total ban, there is no 
possible way that any court could hold that such a ban would be sufficiently 
narrowly tailored to survive strict scrutiny. 
 
 
V. POSSIBLE PRIOR RESTRAINTS ACCEPTABLE UNDER THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 
This does not mean that there is no state (or federal) regulation that could 
survive strict scrutiny.194 In fact, the means for doing so are relatively simple: 
the government needs only to avoid the defects in prior regulation attempts 
that violated the Constitution. For example, if Washington enacts a law 
categorically prohibiting the possession, transmission, or use of CAD files 
 
191 See Section III(C) supra. It is important to note that the phrase amateur gunsmith  is not used 
to connotate an individual making unauthorized attempts to fabricate or modify firearms, but rather 
individual smiths who operate on a small (usually single brick and mortar shop) scale that do not have the 
same financial resources as a conventional large-scale manufacturer. 
192 In light of the substantial and expansive threats to free expression posed by content-based 
restrictions, this Court has rejected as startling and dangerous  a free-floating test for First Amendment 
coverage . . . [based on] an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits.  United States v. 
Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (quoting United States v. Stephens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010)). 
193 Listing of Federal Firearms Licensees, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL TOBACCO & FIREARMS (2017), 
https://www.atf.gov/firearms/listing-federal-firearms-licensees-ffls-2017.  
194 We have emphasized that it is the rare case in which a State demonstrates that a speech 
restriction is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest.  Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 
1656, 1665 66 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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for the purposes of designing or manufacturing a firearm, that law is not 
sufficiently narrowly tailored and violates the First Amendment. But if 
Washington enacts a law prohibiting the possession, transmission, or use of 
CAD files for the purpose of designing or manufacturing a firearm by any 
person prohibited by state or federal law from obtaining firearms, that statute 
would not affect the lawful speakers using the CAD files and so is sufficiently 
narrowly tailored.  
The state could also define specifically the lawful uses of the files and 
provide that only those who have a predetermined lawful purpose are able to 
possess the files. For example, Washington could enact a law that required 
all individuals who possess, transmit, or use a CAD file to design or 
manufacture a firearm hold or be employed by a federal firearm license 
holder, or be enrolled in a mechanical engineering program at an accredited 
university and acting within the scope of their education. Both proposals 
would regulate the evil sought to be prevented by the state (acquisition of 
firearms by prohibited persons) without burdening or censoring a substantial 
population of speakers not associated with that evil. 
Lastly, the state could allow the executive to authorize possession and 
use of the CAD files on a case by case basis. However, the state would need 
to avoid the constitutional defects associated with the similar federal 
regulatory scheme.195 Any abuse of the discretion afforded to the executive 
decision maker would need to be swiftly redressed and diligently 
prevented.196 To prevent any arguable abuse of discretion, the state must 
carefully craft the statute so the language unambiguously defines what acts 
and what actors are subject to regulation and specifically enumerate what 
factors the state actor can and cannot consider in his decision.197 For example, 
the statute could mandate that the decision maker only consider an 
affiliation. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The controversy surrounding 3D printed firearms presents a complex 
legal issue because of the uncertain First Amendment status of the CAD files 
at heart of the controversy. With an accurate understanding of the properties 
of computer code and computer science,198 it becomes abundantly clear that 
 
195 See supra Section IV(A). 
196 See id. 
197 See id. 
198 See supra Section II. 
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computer code is a medium of pure speech. It is a language that translates 
ideas in an identical fashion to traditional spoken languages, and therefore 
should be protected by the First Amendment in the same vein as the spoken 
or written word.199 Sound legal precedent200 and historical analogs201 from 
the founding era support this conclusion. By accurately considering computer 
code as pure speech, it is evident that the Western District of Texas erred in 
applying the less rigorous standard of intermediate scrutiny reserved for 
expressive conduct.202 
 It is also clear that the existing federal and prospective state regulations 
against the CAD files fail to satisfy the weighty standard required to allow a 
prior restraint on pure speech.203 Existing federal regulation is 
constitutionally invalid because the DDTC acted without regard to the 
channeling mechanisms placed on its discretion by Congress.204 Therefore, 
de jure character as a content neutral or 
content based regulatory scheme, their de facto application was, as regulatory 
schemes, with boundless discretion that resulted in politically motivated 
viewpoint discrimination.205 The Court has categorically refused to allow 
such schemes to survive judicial review.206 
Prospective state legislation in the form of a total prohibition is 
unconstitutional because there is no historical support for a categorical 
exclusion of the files from the protection of the First Amendment.207 
Furthermore, because a total prohibition censors such a large pool of lawful 
speakers, it is not sufficiently narrowly tailored to survive the strict scrutiny 
analysis associated with evaluation of a content-based prior restraint.208 
The federal or state governments remain free to regulate the CAD files 
in ways that avoid the constitutional defects explored in this comment. So 
long as the discretion of the presiding governmental authority is channeled 
when deciding who can access the files, and the regulatory law allows for 
sufficient alternative channels for non-prohibited persons to access and use 
 
199 Bernstein v. U.S. Dep t of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1435 (N.D. Cal. 1996). 
200 See supra Section III(A). 
201 See supra Section III(B). 
202 See supra Section IV(A). 
203 See supra Section IV. 
204 See supra Section IV(A). 
205 See id. 
206 Viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form of content discrimination. The 
government must abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or 
perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.  Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. 
of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). 
207 See supra Section IV(B)(I). 
208 See supra Section IV(B)(II). 
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the files for a lawful purpose, the laws will not violate the First Amendment 
rights of those publishing, transferring, or consuming the CAD files. 
